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Abstract 
This paper shows the vulnerabilities present in a wireless sensor network implemented 
over a long-range wide area network (LoRaWAN) LoRaWAN, and identifies possible attacks 
that could be made to the network using sniffing and/or replay. Attacks on the network 
were performed by implementing a protocol analyzer (Sniffer) to capture packets. The 
Sniffer was implemented using the RTL2832U hardware and visualized in Wireshark, 
through GNU-Radio. Tests showed that data availability and confidentiality could be 
threatened through replay attacks with LoRa server verification using HackRF One and 
GNU-Radio hardware. Although the LoRaWAN specification has, frame counters to avoid 
replay attacks, under given the right conditions, this measure could be violated even deny 
service to the node on the server. 
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Resumen 
En este documento se muestran las vulnerabilidades presentes en una red de sensores 
inalámbricas implementada sobre una red de área amplia de largo alcance (LoRaWAN por 
sus siglas en inglés) LoRaWAN y se identifican los posibles ataques que se podrían realizar 
a la red usando sniffing y/o replay. Los ataques a la red se realizaron implementando un 
analizador de protocolos (Sniffer) para capturar los paquetes. El Sniffer se implementó 
utilizando el hardware RTL2832U y se visualizó en Wireshark, a través de GNU-Radio. Las 
pruebas mostraron que se pueden amenazar la disponibilidad y confidencialidad de los 
datos a través de ataques de replay con verificación en el LoRa server utilizando hardware 
HackRF One y GNU-Radio. Aunque la especificación LoRaWAN tiene contadores para 
evitar ataques de replay, bajo condiciones adecuadas se lograría vulnerar la red llegando a 
realizar la denegación del servicio del nodo en el servidor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of Internet of Things (IoT) 
is relatively new; it first appeared between 
2008 and 2009. It was defined by CISCO 
Internet Business Solutions Group (IBSG) 
as the time when more inanimate objects 
were connected to the Internet than people 
[1]. Today, the IoT has a great impact on 
people’s daily life. New devices with 
Internet connection are constantly being 
created, so not only people but also objects 
use the network in order to operate 
properly or perform the tasks for which 
they were created. 
The IoT has environmental, industrial, 
urban, familiar, and personal applications. 
These new technologies offer great 
possibilities due to IoT’s ability to capture 
processes and transmit information [2]. 
Although there are many advantages to 
IoT technologies, device security is a 
particularly important aspect, especially 
for wireless networks [3]. The lack of a 
clear and well-defined information security 
policy inevitably leads to unauthorized 
access to a network or its devices, which 
can cause serious problems in most cases 
[4].  
Due to the great number of possibilities 
offered by the IoT, many companies have 
introduced innovative solutions to the 
market and, as a result, different 
infrastructures have been created for IoT 
management and control. Some of the 
solutions include SigFox, a 
telecommunications network with wide 
coverage focused on low-power devices [5]; 
Symphony, specialized in overcoming 
difficulties in LoPoWANs (Low-Power 
Wide Area Networks) [6]; networks, 
Zigbee, used in many applications due to 
its short range, low power consumption, 
low data transmission, and high security 
[7]; and LoRaWANs, a scheme for 
addressing long-range links also known as 
LoRa [8]. This set of standards includes 
new technological approaches to data 
transmission security [9]. In addition to 
the development of infrastructure for IoT 
management, several technologies are 
widely used in the deployment and success 
of IoT-based products and services: radio 
frequency identification (RFID), wireless 
sensor networks (WSN), middleware, cloud 
computing, and IoT software applications 
[10]. Wireless technologies change very 
rapidly; new products and features are 
continuously introduced. However, their 
new capabilities can produce new threats 
or vulnerabilities to equipment and data 
security.  
Networking with LoRa devices can be 
divided into two fundamental parts: one 
section from the end nodes to the gateway, 
and another section from the gateway to 
the servers. On the one hand, the second 
section includes several available security 
solutions, as this is not unique to LoRa 
devices. On the other hand, the first 
section may be susceptible to security 
attacks, so this part of the network cannot 
be considered a trusted network entity 
[11]. 
When analyzing the vulnerabilities in 
the first section of the network, the 
possibility of making attacks to the 
network by using sniffing and/or relay 
techniques was found. From these possible 
attacks, it is clear that LoRa has inherent 
weaknesses caused by the compromises 
made in its design [11]. 
As mentioned above, the main risk of 
these security failures is the theft of 
sensitive and/or confidential information; 
therefore, new methods are necessary to 
eliminate or minimize these failures [12]. 
For this purpose, one of the most 
practical tools in network security is a 
sniffer. This tool is usually employed by 
hackers but also network managers to 
maintain the security level of their 
networks (identifying the vulnerabilities it 
may present, such as device A cannot 
establish communication with device B) 
and even to efficiently manage the 
network, since it can identify the stability 
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of a network with tremendous ease and 
perform audits in a very short time. 
A sniffer records all the information 
that is sent in a wireless network, as well 
as any activity carried out. That is, it has 
the ability to capture and record any 
transfer of information, through which it is 
possible to discover bottlenecks in the 
network [13]. 
This article is organized as follows: 
Section 2 describes the configuration and 
hardware used for testing. Section 3 
reports the test results of network attacks 
and the discussion. Finally, Section 4 
presents the conclusions and future 
research. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY  
 
LoRaWAN defines two node activation 
procedures: 1) Over The Air Activation 
(OTAA), in which the final device sends a 
join request to the gateway and the 
gateway returns the data from the network 
server; and 2) Activation by 
Personalization (ABP), in which the 
required information is stored in the 
memory of the nodes, so communication is 
not necessary to join the network. 
In addition, LoRaWAN networks have 
two security layers: the “Network Session 
Key”, which ensures the authenticity of the 
node; and the “Application Session Key”, 
used for data reliability [14]. However, in 
order to test the security provided by the 
protocol, some attacks were carried out on 
an A-class network. The measurements 
were taken with the hardware listed below: 
 
-MultiTech mDot nodes 
-LM35 temperature sensors  
-Pressure and temperature    
sensor BMP280 
-RTL2832U 
-HackRF One analyzer  
-Wireshark software 
-GNU-Radio 
-MultiTech gateway 
 
The network was implemented with the 
previous hardware plus a network server 
that was also a LoRa server. 
 
2.1 Eavesdropping 
 
This kind of attack requires a sniffer to 
capture data passively; in this work 
packets sent from nodes to the gateway are 
captured by using GNU-Radio, Wireshark, 
and RLT2832U. Fig. 1, shows the 
configuration used to implement the 
eavesdropping test. The four A-class nodes 
are configured in a star topology, in which 
the gateway and the sniffer receive the 
sent data. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Network Topology. Source: Authors. 
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A simple configuration in GNU-Radio is 
used to capture and send the data received 
by the sniffer. Fig. 2, shows this 
arrangement with a Spread Factor (SF) of 
about only 12. 
LoRa Receiver blocks were obtained 
using the gr-lora repository [15]. The RTL-
SDR Source block enables the 
configuration of the hardware parameters 
of the RTL2832U sniffer (sample rate, 
center capture rate, and gain, among 
others). WX GUI blocks are employed to 
display the captured signal (Fast Fourier 
Transform and the signal spectrogram). 
LoRa Receiver blocks capture the frames 
received by the sniffer in a specific 
channel; in these blocks, it is possible to 
configure the central frequency, the 
reception channel, the signal bandwidth, 
and the propagation factor. Three blocks 
are used to capture the three possible 
channels in a transmission and, finally, the 
Message Socket Sink blocks allow GNU-
Radio to communicate with Wireshark 
software and send the data captured to the 
port and IP address specified in the block 
as well as the LoRaWAN frame counter. 
 
2.2 Replay 
 
This attack, which consists in copying 
the transmitted signal to supplant the 
node, was implemented with a Software-
Defined Radio (SDR) device. The device, a 
HackRF One, was configured through 
GNU-Radio, allowing it to make copies 
(Fig. 3) of the signals transmitted by the 
nodes to send them later (Fig. 4). 
The replay tests were performed with 
three configurations. The first one verified 
if the server accepted the data copied from 
the node. The second one copied the data 
without the join request. The third one 
used the frame counter. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. GNU-Radio blocks. Source: Authors. 
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Fig. 3. General RX configuration. Source: authors. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. General TX configuration. Source: Authors. 
 
2.2.1 Configuration 1  
 
For this scenario, a malicious node was 
used to access the network by copying 
authentication data and some data 
messages collected by sensors in order to 
verify if the server accepted the copied 
messages. After copying the signals with 
the HackRF One, the authentic node was 
disconnected from the network and the 
signal replicas of the malicious node 
continued to be sent. 
 
2.2.2  Configuration 2 
 
In this test, the data was copied 
without the join-request, keeping the node 
connected in order to falsify the data. 
 
2.2.3 Configuration 3 
 
This configuration consisted in waiting 
until the sequential number of the frame-
counter inside the message was restarted 
The test was performed while waiting 
for the counter to be reset to zero in order 
to send the copied data at the time the 
counter matches the counter of previously 
copied messages. 
 
 
3.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The following are the results obtained 
after carrying out the attacks described 
above and a discussion about the possible 
causes that enabled them. 
 
3.1 Eavesdropping 
 
Fig. 5 shows the data captured in 
Wireshark, in which the received data that 
belongs to a specific node is discriminated. 
The captured data can be seen in 
hexadecimal format (but they are 
encrypted), and the data organized in the 
blocks sent by a UDP frame are located at 
the bottom. 
Evidently, the attack was successful. 
However, the implemented sniffer did not 
inform Wireshark of the response 
messages from the server to the nodes. In 
addition, the counter was not encrypted. 
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Fig. 5. Captured data. Source: Authors. 
 
3.2 Replay 
 
The results obtained with the different 
configurations described above are the 
following. 
 
3.2.1 Configuration 1 
 
In order to verify whether the attack 
was successful, the application response of 
a message sent by a genuine node was 
compared to the application response of a 
message sent by the malicious node. Fig. 6 
and Fig. 7 show the application responses 
to the messages. 
Request messages in the node and 
answer messages in the server are 
necessary. They are captured by the 
malicious device that copies the signals. 
However, the answer messages are not 
relevant to the proposed test since, when 
the attack is continuously performed, the 
request and answer messages are sent 
again by the malicious node, so the attack 
fails. Although the response messages from 
the server could be removed from the 
copied file, the attack would still fail 
because the malicious device is unable to 
obtain the authentication keys sent in 
response to the forged join request. 
 
3.2.2 Configuration 2 
 
Although the data sent by the malicious 
node is received at the gateway and its 
identifier suggests that it was sent by the 
original node, the server rejects the data 
and they are not considered due to a 
synchronism failure in the message 
counter field. Whether the authentic node 
continues to send messages or not, the 
counter in the malicious node will not 
match the number stored in the counter 
that controls the server.  
 
3.2.3 Configuration 3 
 
The success or failure of the attack is 
verified by comparing the responses of the 
application to the different messages that 
were sent. Fig. 8, shows the synchronism of 
both the malicious node and the authentic 
node with the counter. In addition, the 
malicious node sends the message before 
the authentic node does. 
Fig. 9, shows that the server only 
accepts messages from the authentic node. 
Activation by ABP has a critical 
vulnerability because the keys are 
invariable and do not need constant 
authentication in the network. Therefore, a 
malicious message, as long as it meets the 
following requirements, can be accepted by 
the LoRaWAN network server: -Session 
keys are the same as those of an accepted 
end device. 
 
-DevAddr field is the same as that of an 
accepted end device. 
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Fig. 6. Messages sent by the real node. Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Messages sent by the malicious node. Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  8. Gateway message reception. Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
Fig.  9. Server reception. Source: Authors. 
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-Frame counter value is acceptable [16]. 
-Session keys are the same as those of 
an accepted end device. 
-DevAddr field is the same as that of an 
accepted end device. 
-Frame counter value is acceptable [16]. 
  
Although the previous conditions were 
met, the attack was not successful because 
the initialization of the nodes was carried 
out by OTAA. This created new coding 
keys each time a new session was 
completed. In addition, the malicious 
device (HackRF One) could not accurately 
copy the signal due to interference factors, 
sampling rate, or message transmission 
power. As a result, the message format was 
not valid for the application and rejected 
despite the fact that it was synchronous, 
i.e., it matched the value of the counter. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main problem in carrying out an 
eavesdropping attack in a LoRaWAN 
configuration is obtaining the required 
hardware because GNU-Radio configures 
the hardware and manipulates the signals 
with relatively effortless simplicity.  
A sequence of frames was captured, 
visualized, and analyzed during the 
eavesdropping attack. 
The implemented sniffer captures 
messages sent from the node to the server, 
but not the responses from the server to 
the node when performing replay attacks. 
As noted, the HackRF One successfully 
copied all the messages. By capturing the 
response message from the server to the 
node, it will therefore decode the 
subsequent messages sent by the node.  
Said sniffer only takes the message if it 
is configured with the same SF as the 
message sent, which hinders the attack on 
the node if this parameter is set in the 
message sent. 
Frame counters are a measure 
proposed by the LoRaWAN specification to 
avoid replay attacks. However, given the 
right conditions, this measure could be 
violated. Even if the malicious node 
manages to keep sending frames for 
enough time, a denial of service to the node 
by the server could occur.  
It was determined that a LoRaWAN 
implements has implements good 
measures to avoid replay attacks in OTAA 
activation. ABP activation 
countermeasures were not tested since 
that type of activation was not used. 
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